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Recently, a new type of quantum key distribution, called the round-robin differential-phase-shift
(RRDPS) protocol [Nature 509, 475 (2014)], was proposed, where the security can be guaranteed
without monitoring any statistics. In this paper, we investigate source imperfections and side-
channel attacks on the source of this protocol. We show that only three assumptions are needed for
the security, and no detailed characterizations of the source or the side-channel attacks are needed.
This high robustness is another striking advantage of the RRDPS protocol over other protocols.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) enables two distant
parties (Alice and Bob) to generate a key, which is se-
cret from any eavesdropper (Eve). Since the invention
of the first QKD protocol, Bennett Brassard 1984 proto-
col [1], there have been proposed many QKD protocols
for both discrete variable protocols [2–7] and continu-
ous variable protocols [8, 9]. One of the most impor-
tant tasks in the security proof is to derive an upper
bound on the information leakage to Eve. Convention-
ally, it has been believed that the information leakage
can be estimated by monitoring some statistics by Al-
ice and Bob during the quantum communication part of
the QKD protocol [10–20]. Recently, a new type of pro-
tocol, the round-robin differential-phase-shift (RRDPS)
protocol [21] was proposed and surprisingly, the infor-
mation leakage of this protocol is estimated without any
monitoring, but it depends only on the state prepared by
Alice. This property leads to some practical advantages,
such as the better tolerance on the bit error rate and the
fast convergence in the finite key regime [21]. This pro-
tocol has attracted intensive attentions from theoretical
works [22, 23], and proof-of-principle experiments have
been demonstrated [23–26].
In practice, there are some issues to be addressed to
guarantee the security of the RRDPS protocol when it is
actually implemented. These issues arise because there
is a gap between the properties of the actual devices used
in QKD systems and the mathematical model that the
security proofs assume, which is also the case for all QKD
protocols. Therefore, to bridge this gap is crucial for the
implementation security, and many works have been de-
voted in this direction [17, 27–33]. In the case of the
RRDPS protocol, all the security analyses including the
original proof [21] and the recent works [22, 23] have
made ideal assumptions on Alice’s light source (for in-
stance, phase modulations are assumed to be perfect and
any side-channel attacks are excluded). Therefore, to
consider the security proof accommodating source flaws
is indispensable toward a practical and secure implemen-
tation of the RRDPS protocol.
In this paper, we extend the security proof of [21] to
accommodate the source flaws. Surprisingly, we found
that the security can be guaranteed based only on the
three assumptions on Alice’s source. These assumptions
are on the probability of emitting the vacuum state, on
the probability that L light pulses contain more than
a particular number of photons, and on the indepen-
dence among the sending states. Importantly, no as-
sumptions on the phase modulation or detailed specifi-
cations of imperfections and side-channel attacks on the
source are needed. Even with these imperfections and
side-channels, we show that the RRDPS protocol can
distribute the key over longer distances. These results
show that the RRDPS protocol is highly robust against
the source flaws, which is another striking advantage of
this protocol over other protocols.
Before explaining the security of the RRDPS protocol
with the flawed sources, we summarize the assumptions
we made on the devices. First, as for Alice’s side, she
employs blocks of L light pulses, and applies phase mod-
ulation θ
(k)
ak (1 ≤ k ≤ L) to each of the pulses depending
on a randomly chosen bit ak ∈ {0, 1}. The assumptions
on Alice’s sending states are summarized as follows.
A1. For every light pulse, the probability of the vacuum
emission for the bit value 0(1) is upper and lower bounded
by pU,0(1)(0) and pL,0(1)(0), respectively (see Section 1 in
the Supplementary material for the discussions on the es-
timation of these bounds for some experimental setups).
A2. The L pulses contain in total at most νth photons
except for the probability esrc.
A3. There is no quantum and classical correlation among
the sending states, and the system that purifies each of
the sending states is possessed by Alice.
We note that when more detailed characteristics of the
source is available, we can relax the assumption A3 to
accommodate any classical correlations among the send-
ing pulses. In general, a classically correlated L-pulse
state is written as ρˆ =
∫
p(τ1, ..., τL)
⊗L
k=1 ρˆτkdτ1...dτL,
where τk (1 ≤ k ≤ L) denotes an internal parameter in
the source to decide the kth-pulse state. Here, the prob-
2ability distribution p(τ1, ..., τL) can be arbitrary as long
as it satisfies
∫
p(τ1, ..., τL)dτ1...dτL = 1. If Alice knows
the upper and the lower bounds on the vacuum emis-
sion probability of the state ρˆτk and the upper bound
on the probability that the photon number contained in⊗L
k=1 ρˆτk exceeds a certain threshold for any realization
of τk (k = 1, ...., L), then we can prove the security even
if the pulses are classically correlated in any manner. As
an example of such a case, we discuss the security when
each of the sending pulse is in a coherent state for any
τk and for any k (see Section 4 in the Supplementary
material for more detail). In the following discussion, we
assume that Alice has no knowledge about such detailed
characterizations, and we prove the security based only
on the assumptions A1, A2 and A3.
We emphasize that we do not make any assumptions on
phase modulations. Obviously, in order to generate a se-
cret key, θ
(k)
0 and θ
(k)
1 need to be controlled such that the
resulting bit error rate is low enough. However, for the
security proof, this precise control over the phase mod-
ulation is not needed: our security proof holds not only
when the actual value of phase modulations {θ(k)0 , θ(k)1 }
do not coincide with {0, π}, but also when Alice has no
knowledge about θ
(k)
0 and θ
(k)
1 . The assumption A2 re-
quires that Pr
[∑L
k=1 nk > νth
]
≤ esrc must be satisfied,
where nk denotes the number of photons included in the
kth pulse, which would be obtained if we measured it, and
the L.H.S represents the probability that the total photon
number existing in the L pulses exceeds νth. We also em-
phasize that we do not make the single-mode assumption
on the pulse, and the mode can depend on the bit value.
This includes, for instance, the following cases: (1) the
polarization of the pulse depends on the chosen bit value
and (2) Eve performs a Trojan-horse-attack (THA) [34],
where she injects a strong light pulse to Alice’s source
to obtain some information on the source from the back-
reflected pulse.
From the assumption of the independence among
the sending states described in A3, the kth send-
ing state is expressed as a partial trace over the
system An of the following state |Ψak,k〉An,B =∑
w
√
c
(k)
w,ak Uˆ
(k)
ak |w(k)ak 〉An |ϕ(k)w,ak〉B, where c(k)w,ak are non-
negative real numbers satisfying
∑
w c
(k)
w,ak = 1, Uˆ
(k)
ak
is an arbitrary unitary operator on the system An,
{|w(k)ak 〉An}w are orthonormal bases of the ancilla system,
and {|ϕ(k)w,ak〉B}w are orthonormal bases to diagonalize
the density operator of the sending state
ρˆ(k)ak := trAn |Ψak,k〉〈Ψak,k|An,B. (1)
Note that the system An that purifies each of the send-
ing states is possessed by Alice. Then, for each trial,
Alice sends ⊗Lk=1ρˆ(k)ak to Bob over the quantum chan-
nel. Note that in the original protocol [21], Alice sends
⊗Lk=1eipiaknˆk |Ψ〉 in each trial, where nˆk is the number
operator for the kth pulse, and |Ψ〉 is the L-pulse state
(contains at most νth photons) before performing a per-
fect phase modulation (eipiaknˆk).
As for the assumptions on Bob’s side, they are the same
as those made in the original security proof [21], that
is, Bob uses detectors that can discriminate among the
vacuum, a single-photon, and multi photons, and Bob has
a random number generator (RNG). Using devices with
these assumptions, we describe Bob’s actual procedures
in what follows. Note that Bob’s actual procedures are
the same as those in the original protocol [21]. Bob first
splits L incoming pulses into two trains of pulses, shifts
backwards only one train by r that is chosen randomly
from {1, ..., L − 1}. Then Bob lets each of the first L −
r pulses in the shifted train interfere with each of the
last L − r pulses in the other train with a 50:50 beam
splitter, and performs a photon measurement with the
two detectors. Each of these detectors corresponds to
the bit value of 0 and 1, respectively. Bob takes note
of the bit value when he observes a single-photon in the
original L pulses in total, and otherwise he discards the
data. Also, he records in which time slot he obtained
the single-photon, and he announces this time slot and r
over the classical channel. From those information, Alice
obtains a sifted key akd ⊕ akd+r, where kd denotes the
time slot of the single-photon detection. Bob repeats
this process for many blocks containing L pulses.
Under the assumptions listed above, we prove the se-
curity of the RRDPS protocol with the source flaws. We
note that, for simplicity of the analysis, we consider that
the number of blocks containing L pulses sent is asymp-
totically large. In the proof, we construct a virtual proto-
col that cannot be distinguished from the actual protocol
from Eve’s viewpoint. In this virtual protocol, Alice first
prepares her virtual qubit virA, ancilla qubits and system
B in the following state
|Φ〉virA,An,B = 2−L/2
L⊗
k=1
∑
ak=0,1
|ak〉virA|Ψak,k〉An,B, (2)
and sends only system B to Bob over the quantum chan-
nel. Here, this state is in the tensor product due to the
assumption A3, and we define {|0〉, |1〉} as the Z basis
state.
Next, we explain Bob’s measurement procedures for
the virtual protocol. As explained above, in the actual
protocol, Bob performs an interference measurement on
ith (1 ≤ i ≤ L) and jth (1 ≤ j ≤ L) pulses, where a
difference of i and j is randomly chosen by Bob’s RNG
(i.e., |i − j| = r). In the virtual protocol, however, Bob
does not perform such an interference measurement, but
performs the measurement to determine which pulse con-
tains a single-photon among the incoming L pulses. In
this virtual measurement, the index i is determined by
the location of the single photon (1 ≤ i ≤ L), and the
3other index j is determined as
j = i+ (−1)br (mod L), (3)
where r is randomly chosen from the RNG, and b is ran-
domly chosen from 0 or 1 by Bob. After obtaining the
pair {i, j}, he announces {i, j} to Alice over the classi-
cal channel. Note that Eve has a perfect control over
i because she can freely choose which pulse contains a
single-photon, but she cannot control j at all because j
contains the randomness Bob locally chooses. The reason
why Bob can choose j as Eq. (3) is that the probability
distributions of obtaining i and j if Bob postselects the
successful detection event (i.e., only a single-photon is
detected from the L pulses) are exactly the same for both
actual and virtual protocols for any eavesdropping [21].
This means that the classical information available to
Eve is the same between the two protocols. Therefore,
combined with the equivalence between the virtual and
actual protocols in Alice’s side, we are allowed to discuss
the security based on the virtual protocol. In the virtual
protocol, Alice keeps all the L virtual qubits and the an-
cilla qubits when Bob obtains the successful detection.
The quantity we use to measure the leaked information
is the so-called phase error rate [35], which is related with
the smooth max-entropy [17, 36]. With the phase error
rate eph, the key rate per transmission of one pulse is
expressed as [37]
R = Q[1− fECh(eb)− h(eph)]/L, (4)
where Q denotes the single-photon detection probability
in Bob’s measurement, fEC is an error correction effi-
ciency, and eb denotes the bit error rate in the protocol
and h(x) = −x log2 x− (1− x) log2(1 − x) as the binary
entropy function. Here, h(eph) represents the fraction of
bits to be shortened in the privacy amplification step.
Once the sifted bits are shortened according to this frac-
tion, the phase error information that Eve used to have
becomes totally useless for her guessing the generated
key.
Our goal below is to estimate the upper bound on
the phase error rate. For the estimation, we need
to define the phase error rate, but before we give
its definition, it is convenient to rewrite Eq. (2) as
|Φ〉virA,An,B = 2−L
⊗L
k=1
[√
2 + dk|+〉virA|Φ+k 〉An,B +√
2− dk|−〉virA|Φ−k 〉An,B
]
, where we define |±〉 = (|0〉 ±
|1〉)/√2 as the X basis state,
dk =
∑
w,w′
√
c
(k)
w,0c
(k)
w′,1
(
An
〈
w
′(k)
1 |Uˆ (k)†1 Uˆ (k)0 |w(k)0
〉
An
B
〈
ϕ
(k)
w′,1|ϕ(k)w,0
〉
B
+ C.C.
)
and |Φ±k 〉An,B = (|Ψ0,k〉An,B ±
|Ψ1,k〉An,B)/
√
2± dk. Here, C.C. stands for complex con-
jugate. The key parameter in the security proof is the
vacuum emission probability of |Φ±k 〉An,B, which is de-
fined by p
(k)
± (0) and given by (see Section 2 in the Sup-
plementary material for the detail)
p
(k)
± (0) =
(√
p
(k)
0 (0)±
√
p
(k)
1 (0)
)2
2± dk . (5)
Here p
(k)
0 (0) and p
(k)
1 (0) denote the vacuum emission
probabilities of |Ψ0,k〉An,B and |Ψ1,k〉An,B, respectively.
In the virtual protocol, Alice’s task is to guess the out-
come of the X basis measurement on the jth virtual
qubit. The position of the jth virtual qubit is randomly
chosen from the L−1 virtual qubits according to Eq. (3).
Then, the phase error rate is defined as a fraction that
Alice obtains the measurement outcome − in her X basis
measurement on her jth virtual qubit that is randomly
chosen from the L− 1 virtual qubits. In the phase error
rate estimation, we consider the worst case scenario that
if the total photon number contained in the L pulses ex-
ceeds νth, Bob surely detects such an event as a successful
detection, and Alice obtains the measurement outcome −
on her jth virtual qubit. By combining this worst case
scenario and thanks to the randomness of j from Eq. (3),
the phase error rate is given by
eph = esrc/Q+ (1 − esrc/Q)n−/(L− 1), (6)
where n− denotes the number of the virtual qubits re-
sulted in the measurement outcome of − among the L−1
virtual qubits.
In the following, we explain how to estimate the upper
bound on n−. Here, we use the fact that the statistics
of the X basis measurement on the system virA is not
affected by any operations conducted on the system B.
Therefore, in order to estimate the upper bound on n−,
we are allowed to perform the photon number measure-
ment (PNM) on all the L−1 sending pulses in system B in
Eq. (2). This PNM is an off-line measurement, and is not
performed in either of the actual and virtual protocols.
Let us denote by nu and M
(u)
X ∈ {+,−} the outcome of
the PNM of the uth (1 ≤ u ≤ L − 1) sending pulse and
the X basis measurement outcome performed on Alice’s
uth virtual qubit, respectively. From these measurement
results n1, ..., nL−1, we estimate the upper bound on n
−.
For the later convenience, we decompose n− into
n− = n−nonvac + n
−
vac, (7)
where n−nonvac (n
−
vac) denotes the number of u that satis-
fies nu > 0 (nu = 0) and M
(u)
X = −.
Now, we calculate the upper bound on Eq. (7). First,
we consider to upper bound n−nonvac. In so doing, we
consider two worst case scenarios. The first worst case
scenario is that if the uth sending state includes more
than zero-photon (i.e., nu > 0), we regard M
(u)
X as −.
The second one is that νth photons are distributed over
the L − 1 pulses such that the number of pulses that
contain no photon is minimized. With these two worst
4case scenarios, n−nonvac is upper bounded by
n−nonvac ≤ nnonvac ≤ νth, (8)
where nnonvac denotes the number of u that satisfies nu >
0 among the L − 1 pulses. In Eq. (8), the first and the
second inequalities are due to the first and the second
worst case scenarios, respectively.
Next, we show the upper bound on n−vac, which is given
by (see Section 3 in the Supplementary material for the
detail)
n−vac = 0 (9)
(if p
(k)
0 (0) = p
(k)
1 (0) holds for all k (1 ≤ k ≤ L)),
n−vac ≤
L− 1− νth
2
max
{ (√pU,0(0)−√pL,1(0))2
pU,0(0) + pL,1(0)
,
(
√
pL,0(0)−
√
pU,1(0))
2
pL,0(0) + pU,1(0)
}
+maxNvacd{Nvacdt}
=: n−vac,U (10)
(if p
(k)
0 (0) 6= p(k)1 (0) for some or every k),
where 1 ≤ Nvacd ≤ L − 1 − νth and 0 < t. Note that
Nvacd and t are related with a failure probability ǫ (see
Eq. (17) in the Supplementary material) of the Chernoff
bound [38]. Below, we explain the above results in more
detail.
(i) The first case is that p
(k)
0 (0) = p
(k)
1 (0) is satisfied for
all k (1 ≤ k ≤ L). From Eq. (5), we obtain p(k)− (0) = 0,
and hence n−vac = 0. This means that if nu = 0, M
(u)
X is
+ and never be −. By combining the results in Eqs. (8)
and (9), the phase error rate is upper bounded by
eph ≤ min
{esrc
Q
+
(
1− esrc
Q
) νth
L− 1 , 0.5
}
, (11)
Note that this upper bound is exactly the same as the
one in the original security proof [21].
(ii) The second case is that p
(k)
0 (0) 6= p(k)1 (0) oc-
curs for some or every k. First, we give an example
of how this situation arises. Suppose that Eve per-
forms a THA where she injects a strong pulse to Al-
ice’s source to obtain some information on the source
from the back-reflected light. To prevent this THA, Al-
ice needs to suppress the intensity of the back-reflected
light, which can be accomplished by installing some op-
tical filters or optical isolators [32]. However, one can-
not perfectly suppress the intensity, and moreover optical
components, such as phase modulators, may have polar-
ization dependence [39], which leads to the situation of
p
(k)
0 (0) 6= p(k)1 (0). This means that even if nu = 0, we
cannot conclude M
(u)
X = +. Therefore, n
−
vac results in a
non-zero value, and eph is increased compared with the
one in the case (i). In the case (ii), by combining Eqs.
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FIG. 1: Secret key rate R per pulse versus distances l. The
solid line is for the case (i): p
(k)
0 (0) = p
(k)
1 (0) is satisfied for
all k, and the dashed line is for the case (ii): p
(k)
0 (0) 6= p
(k)
1 (0)
occurs for some or every k.
(8) and (10), the phase error rate can be obtained as
eph ≤ min
{perr
Q
+
(
1− perr
Q
)νth + n−vac,U
L− 1 , 0.5
}
. (12)
Here, we define perr := esrc + ǫ− esrcǫ.
We emphasize that the phase error rate given in
Eqs. (11) and (12) are derived only from the three as-
sumptions: A1, A2 and A3. This property is one of the
striking features of the RRDPS protocol because other
protocols usually need more detailed specifications of im-
perfections [28, 31] and Eve’s side-channel attacks on the
source [32]. In particular, the practical QKD systems are
threatened by the THA [40], and the recent work quanti-
tatively shows that the key generation rate of the BB84
protocol is compromised by this attack [32]. More specif-
ically, [32] shows that when the mean photon number of
the back-reflected light is µout = 10
−2, the achievable
distance of the secure key generation is decreased down
to only 10 km, while it is about 150 km without the
THA. The reason for this drastic degradation is that the
phase error rate is exponentially increasing with the dis-
tance [37]. In the RRDPS protocol, however, even if Eve
performs the THA with µout = 10
−2, the increase of νth
is only about Lµout. Therefore, the increase of eph (e.g.,
L = 100) is about Lµout/(L − 1) ∼ 1% regardless of the
distance, implying that only small amount of the addi-
tional privacy amplification is needed. This shows the
robustness that the RRDPS has against the side-channel
attacks on the source.
Based on the above security proof, we show the key
generation rate simulation results for the cases (i) and
(ii). In the simulation, we assume that Alice uses a
weak coherent light source with the mean photon num-
ber µ0(1) when she chooses the bit 0(1) [41]. We set
the channel transmittance as ηch = 10
−0.2l/10. In the
detection side, we assume the detection efficiency and
the dark count probability as ηd = 0.15 and pd =
5

 
	



FIG. 2: (a) Schematic of Alice’s off-line measurement using the detector decoy method [42]. This shows a detection setup that
combines a variable beam splitter (BS) of transmittance η
(a)
1 or η
(a)
2 (η
(a)
1 > η
(a)
2 ) together with a threshold detector (ThD).
(b) Schematic of Alice’s on-line measurement when she uses a coherent light source. Alice firstly prepares a strong coherent
light, after that she splits it by using a BS with transmittance η (η ≪ 1), and monitors the intensity of the coherent light in
mode b with a conventional power meter (PM).
5 × 10−7, respectively. With these parameters, the
successful detection probability that Bob detects the
single-photon and the bit error rate are assumed to be
given by Q = (Lµ0ηsy)e
−Lµ0ηsy/2 + Lpd and ebit =
(Lµ0ηsye
−Lµ0ηsyesym/2 + Lpd/2)/Q, respectively. Here,
ηsy := ηchηd, and esym is an overall misalignment error of
the optical system, and we assume that esym is 5%. Also,
we set fEC as 1.16.
First, we show the simulation result for the case (i).
In this case, the mean photon number for both bits are
the same µ0 = µ1 =: µ. Under the above conditions, we
plot the key rate R with L = 128 by the solid line in
Fig. 1, where R is optimized over the choice of µ and νth
through the relation esrc = 1−
∑νth
n=0 e
−Lµ(Lµ)n/n!.
Next, we show the simulation result for the case (ii).
We assume that µ1 lies in the range R1 :=
[0.99µ0, 1.01µ0]. In this case, the upper and the lower
bounds on p
(k)
0(1)(0) are given by pU,0(0) = e
−µ0 (pU,1(0) =
e−0.99µ0) and pL,0(0) = e
−µ0 (pL,1(0) = e
−1.01µ0), respec-
tively. Under these conditions, we plot the key rate R
with L = 128 by the dashed line in Fig. 1, where R is
optimized over the choice of µ0, νth and ǫ through the
relation esrc = 1 −minγ∈R1{
∑νth
n=0 e
−Lγ(Lγ)n/n!}. This
dashed line shows that even if p
(k)
0 (0) 6= p(k)1 (0) occurs for
some or every k, the degradation of the key generation
rate is not so compromised. This result also shows the
robustness of the RRDPS protocol against source flaws.
To conclude, we have shown the security of the RRDPS
protocol with imperfect light sources and side-channel at-
tacks on Alice’s source. In our security analysis, the char-
acterization of Alice’s source is simple in the sense that
if Alice monitors only νth, the vacuum emission proba-
bility and the independence among the sending states,
the amount of privacy amplification needed can be ob-
tained. This means that the security of the RRDPS pro-
tocol can be guaranteed without detailed specifications
of the source imperfections and side-channel attacks on
the source. Moreover, we found that if the probabilities
of emitting the vacuum state are the same for both bits,
the phase error rate is exactly the same as the one in
the original paper [21]. Even if these probabilities dif-
fer, the performance of the key generation rate is not
significantly compromised. These results show that the
RRDPS protocol is highly robust against imperfections
and side-channel attacks on the source, which is another
practical advantage that this protocol has over other pro-
tocols.
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SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL
1. ESTIMATION OF THE VACUUM EMISSION PROBABILITY
As we have explained in the assumption A1 in the main text, Alice needs to estimate the upper and the lower
bounds on the vacuum emission probability for each bit value a = 0, 1 (pL,a(0) and pU,a(0)) in the actual experiments.
Here, we propose how to estimate pL,a(0) and pU,a(0) for the following two particular cases. (i) The first case is that
Alice sends identical pulses when she chooses the same bit value. In this case, Alice performs an off-line measurement
for the estimation. (ii) The second case is that Alice employs a coherent light source. In this case, we employ an
on-line monitoring of the intensity of the sending light (see Fig. 1 (b)). Note that this method can be applied to the
case even if the photon number distribution is neither independent nor identical for each of the sending pulses. The
6following are the detailed explanations for (i) and (ii).
(i) First, we propose a method to estimate pL,a(0) and pU,a(0) under the case that Alice sends identical pulses
if she chooses the same bit value i.e., ρˆ
(s)
as = ρˆ
(t)
at is satisfied for any s, t ∈ {1, ..., L} with as = at, where ρˆ(k)ak is
defined in Eq. (1) in the main text. For later convenience, we denote ρˆa by the state when Alice chooses the bit value
a ∈ {0, 1}. Below, we explain how to estimate the bounds on the vacuum emission probability of ρˆa when Alice has a
threshold detector. We consider to perform an off-line measurement to estimate the vacuum emission probability of
ρˆa because the coherence between each photon number state of ρˆa is destroyed if Alice performs an on-line monitoring
of the photon number of each pulse. In this measurement, if Alice has a threshold detector with unit efficiency and
no dark count, it is simple to obtain the bounds on the vacuum emission probability, because the number of the
vacuum obtained in the measurement is the same as the number of the vacuum input to the threshold detector.
However, actual threshold detectors do not satisfy these conditions, and hence we use the detector decoy method [42]
for the estimation of the vacuum emission probability of ρˆa. In this method, Alice firstly places a beam splitter
of transmittance η
(a)
1 before the threshold detector, and counts the number of events where the vacuum outcome
occurred (this number is denoted by N
(a)
1,vac) among the number of emitted signals from Alice’s source (this number is
denoted by N
(a)
1 ). After obtaining N
(a)
1,vac, she repeats the same procedures with a beam splitter of transmittance η
(a)
2
(η
(a)
1 > η
(a)
2 ), and obtains N
(a)
2,vac among N
(a)
2 (see Fig.1 (a)). With N
(a)
j,vac for j = 1, 2, we have the following equation
in the limit of asymptotically large N
(a)
j :
N
(a)
j,vac = N
(a)
j tr[ρˆaΠˆ
(a)
j,vac], (13)
where Πˆ
(a)
j,vac is a POVM element that corresponds to no click in the detector. Here, we assume that the POVM of
the threshold detector with transmittance η
(a)
j which contains two elements Πˆ
(a)
j,nonvac (this element corresponds to the
click event in the detector) , and Πˆ
(a)
j,vac is given by Πˆ
(a)
j,vac = (1−pd)
∑∞
n=0(1−η(a)j ηd)n|n〉〈n| and Πˆ(a)j,nonvac = Iˆ−Πˆ(a)j,vac,
where ηd and pd denote a detection efficiency and a dark count rate, respectively. In Eq. (13), ρˆa can be written as
ρˆa =
∑∞
n=0 pa(n)|n〉〈n| with the Fock bases {|n〉} without loss of generality, because the off diagonal elements do not
affect the measurement outcomes. By substituting the formulas of Πˆ
(a)
j,vac and ρˆa into Eq. (13), N
(a)
j,vac can be rewritten
as
N
(a)
j,vac = N
(a)
j (1− pd)
∞∑
n=0
pa(n)(1 − η(a)j ηd)n. (14)
Note that if we replace N
(a)
j,vac with N
(a)
j,vac + δ in Eq. (14) by using the Hoeffding inequality [43] or the Multiplicative
Chernoff bound [30], we can take into the finite-size effect δ. By using Eq. (14) for j = 1, 2, we have that the upper
and the lower bounds on the vacuum emission probability are respectively described as
pa(0) ≥
(1− ηdη(a)1 )N (a)2,vac/N (a)2 − (1− ηdη(a)2 )N (a)1,vac/N (a)1
ηd(η
(a)
2 − η(a)1 )(1− pd)
, (15)
=: pL,a(0), (16)
and
pa(0) ≤ min
{ N (a)1,vac
(1− pd)N (a)1
,
N
(a)
2,vac
(1− pd)N (a)2
}
(17)
=: pU,a(0). (18)
(ii) Next, we consider how to estimate pL,a(0) and pU,a(0) for each bit value a = 0, 1 when Alice employs a coherent
light source i.e., she knows the photon number distribution of each of the pulses as the Poissonian. Note that this
method here can be applied to the case even if the photon number distribution is not identical and independent for
each of the sending pulses. In order to estimate the vacuum emission probability for the kth sending pulse (1 ≤ k ≤ L),
Alice firstly prepares a strong coherent light |β(k)ak 〉 with |β|2 ≫ 1, and she splits it by using a beam splitter with
transmittance η (η ≪ 1) as |β(k)ak 〉 → |√ηβ(k)ak 〉a|
√
1− ηβ(k)ak 〉b. The light in mode a is the kth sending light to Bob
after the phase modulation, and the light in mode b is an on-line monitoring light whose intensity is monitored by a
conventional power meter. By this on-line monitoring, she obtains knowledge on the intensity of the coherent light
7before the beam splitter as β
−(k)
ak ≤ β(k)ak ≤ β+(k)ak (see Fig.1 (b)) for all k (1 ≤ k ≤ L). Once Alice knows from the
monitoring the range of β
(k)
ak for all k, we have that the bounds on the vacuum emission probability of the sending
light in mode a are described as
pU,a(0) = max
k∈{1,...,L}
e−ηβ
−(k)
ak , (19)
pL,a(0) = min
k∈{1,...,L}
e−ηβ
+(k)
ak . (20)
In the above estimations ((i) and (ii)), we have ignored any side-channels on the source i.e., we explained the
estimation methods for pU,a(0) and pL,a(0) under the assumption that Alice’s laboratory is perfectly protected from
the environment outside. However, in the actual implementations, this assumption is not guaranteed because of Eve’s
side-channel attacks such as Trojan-Horse Attacks (THA) [34]. Therefore, in order to certify the assumption A1 in the
practical implementations, we need to estimate pU,a(0) and pL,a(0) including the Trojan horse light, and we explain
this issue in what follows. In this attack, Eve injects a bright light pulse in the coherent state |√µin〉 into Alice’s
apparatus through the optical fiber, and she obtains a back-reflected light containing the information on the phase
modulator. Recently, in order to prevent a particular THA, passive architecture method was proposed [32]. In this
method, Alice places an optical isolator, an attenuator, and an optical filter in order to suppress the intensity of the
incoming light to her apparatus. Suppose that µout be the intensity of the back-reflected light from her apparatus,
the upper and the lower bounds on the vacuum emission probability (denoted by pTHAU,a (0) and p
THA
L,a (0), respectively)
are given by the following modifications to pU,a(0) and pL,a(0)
pTHAU,a (0) = e
−µoutpU,a(0), (21)
pTHAL,a (0) = e
−µoutpL,a(0), (22)
respectively. Therefore, the vacuum emission probability can be estimated even when the particular Trojan horse
light affects on the vacuum emission probability.
2. DERIVATION OF p
(k)
+ (0) AND p
(k)
−
(0)
Here, we derive Eq. (5) in the main text, which is the vacuum emission probability of |Φ±k 〉AnB. This is calculated
as
p
(k)
± (0) = tr[|0〉〈0|B|Φ±k 〉〈Φ±k |An,B] (23)
= ||B
〈
0|Φ±k
〉
An,B
||2 (24)
=
1
2± dk
∣∣∣∣∣∣∑
w
(√
c
(k)
w,0B
〈
0|ϕ(k)w,0
〉
B
Uˆ
(k)
0 |w(k)0 〉An ±
√
c
(k)
w,1B
〈
0|ϕ(k)w,1
〉
B
Uˆ
(k)
1 |w(k)1 〉An
)∣∣∣∣∣∣2. (25)
If Uˆ
(k)
0 is chosen such that
∑
w
√
c
(k)
w,0B
〈
0|ϕ(k)w,0
〉
B
Uˆ
(k)
0 |w(k)0 〉An becomes parallel to∑
w
√
c
(k)
w,1B
〈
0|ϕ(k)w,1
〉
B
Uˆ
(k)
1 |w(k)1 〉An , and the inner product of these two states becomes positive, Eq. (25) leads to
p
(k)
± (0) =
(√
p
(k)
0 (0)±
√
p
(k)
1 (0)
)2
/(2± dk), where we use p(k)ak (0) = tr[ρˆ(k)ak |0〉〈0|B] =
∣∣∣∑w
√
c
(k)
w,akB
〈
0|ϕ(k)w,ak
〉
B
∣∣∣2.
3. ESTIMATION OF eph WHEN p
(k)
0 (0) 6= p
(k)
1 (0) OCCURS FOR SOME OR EVERY k
Here, we derive Eq. (10) in the main text, which is the upper bound on n−vac when p
(k)
0 (0) 6= p(k)1 (0) occurs for some
or every k. In so doing, we construct a stochastic trial. For this, we introduce the random variable for the lth trial
(1 ≤ l ≤ Nvacd) as
X(l) =
{
1 (if M
(l)
X = −)
0 (if M
(l)
X = +).
(26)
8Here, Nvacd corresponds to the number of those instances with p
(k)
0 (0) 6= p(k)1 (0) among the L−1 pulses. As explained
in the assumption A1, since Alice does not know the exact probabilities of emitting the vacuum state for both bits,
Nvacd cannot be obtained in the actual experiments. What Alice knows about Nvacd is just a range, which Nvacd lies
in:
1 ≤ Nvacd ≤ L− 1− νth. (27)
Now, to obtain the upper bound on n−vac, we use the Chernoff bound [38]. From this inequality,
Pr[n−vac −
Nvacd∑
l=1
p(X(l) = 1) > Nvacdt] ≤ ǫ (28)
is obtained for any t ∈ [0, 1− pave], where pave := 1/Nvacd
∑Nvacd
l=1 p(X
(l) = 1). Here, the parameter ǫ is given by
ǫ = exp[−D(pave + t||pave)Nvacd], (29)
where D(p||q) := p ln p/q + (1− p) ln (1− p)/(1− q).
Eq. (28) means that
n−vac ≤
Nvacd∑
l=1
p(X(l) = 1) +Nvacdt (30)
holds with the probability 1 − ǫ. Here, p(X(l) = 1) represents the probability that Alice’s X basis measurement
outcome on the lth virtual qubit is − conditioned on the vacuum emission. This is calculated by using Eq. (5) in the
main text and Eq. (26) as
p(X(l) = 1) = p(M
(l)
X = −|nl = 0)
=
p(M
(l)
X = − ∧ nl = 0)∑
S∈{+,−} p(M
(l)
X = S ∧ nl = 0)
=
(√
p
(l)
0 (0)−
√
p
(l)
1 (0)
)2
2(p
(l)
0 (0) + p
(l)
1 (0))
. (31)
Finally, by considering the upper bound on Eq. (31), we obtain the upper bound on Eq. (30) as
n−vac ≤
L− 1− νth
2
max
{ (√pU,0(0)−√pL,1(0))2
pU,0(0) + pL,1(0)
,
(
√
pL,0(0)−
√
pU,1(0))
2
pL,0(0) + pU,1(0)
}
+maxNvacd{Nvacdt}
=: n−vac,U, (32)
where the maximization of Nvacd is taken over the constraint in Eq. (27).
4. PHASE ERROR RATE ESTIMATION WITH COHERENT LIGHT SOURCE
As we have explained on page 1 in the main text, when Alice has more detailed characteristics of the source, we can
relax the assumption A3 to accommodate any classical correlations among the sending states. In general, a classically
correlated L-pulse state when Alice chooses an L-bit string as a1, ..., aL is expressed as
ρˆ
(a1,...,aL)
B =
∫
p(τ1, ..., τL)
L⊗
k=1
ρˆ(k)ak,τkdτ1...dτL. (33)
Here, τk (1 ≤ k ≤ L) denotes the parameter to determine the kth sending state. p(τ1, ..., τL) denotes a probability dis-
tribution to determine the realization of the L-pulse state
⊗L
k=1 ρˆ
(k)
ak,τk , and we do not need to characterize p(τ1, ..., τL)
except for the normalization condition
∫
p(τ1, ..., τL)dτ1...dτL = 1. In order to accommodate the classical correlations,
Alice needs to guarantee that the following two conditions are satisfied for any realizations ξ := τ1, ..., τL (ξ denotes
an internal parameter of Alice’s source to determine the realization of the L-pulse state). The two conditions are (i)
the upper bound on the number of photons contained in the state
⊗L
k=1 ρˆ
(k)
ak,τk except for a probability esrc, and (ii)
the upper and the lower bounds on the vacuum emission probability of each pulse ρˆ
(k)
ak,τk for both bits b = 0, 1.
9As an example of satisfying the conditions (i) and (ii), here we consider the case where Alice knows that the sending
L pulses are coherent states for any ξ, and the mean photon number of all the sending states for Alice’s choice of
the bit b ∈ {0, 1} lies in the range [µ(min)b , µ(max)b ]. For deriving the phase error rate, we introduce a virtual protocol,
which is the same as the actual protocol from Eve’s viewpoint. In this protocol, before sending the L-pulse state to
Bob, Alice randomly chooses a particular realization of the sending states in the tensor product state according to
the probability distribution p(ξ) := p(τ1, ..., τL), and let e
(ξ)
ph denote the phase error rate for the L-pulse state with the
realization ξ. From the convexity structure of Eq. (33), the phase error rate of ρˆ
(a1,...,aL)
B can be written as
eph =
∫
p(ξ)e
(ξ)
ph dξ, (34)
and from Eq. (34), we trivially obtain the following inequality
eph ≤ max
ξ
e
(ξ)
ph . (35)
Below, we first derive e
(ξ)
ph , and then we consider the upper bound on the R.H.S of Eq. (35).
In order to derive e
(ξ)
ph , we use Eq. (12), and obtain the upper bound on e
(ξ)
ph as
e
(ξ)
ph ≤
perr
Q
+
(
1− perr
Q
)ν(ξ)th + n−,(ξ)vac,U
L− 1 , (36)
where ν
(ξ)
th denotes the number of photons contained in the state
⊗L
k=1 ρ
(k)
ak,τk , and from Eq. (10), n
−,(ξ)
vac,U in Eq. (36)
is given by
n
−,(ξ)
vac,U =
L− 1− ν(ξ)th
2
max
{(√p(ξ)U,0(0)−
√
p
(ξ)
L,1(0)
)2
p
(ξ)
U,0(0) + p
(ξ)
L,1(0)
,
(√
p
(ξ)
L,0(0)−
√
p
(ξ)
U,1(0)
)2
p
(ξ)
L,0(0) + p
(ξ)
U,1(0)
}
+max
N
(ξ)
vacd
{N (ξ)vacdt}, (37)
where 1 ≤ N (ξ)vacd ≤ L − 1 − ν(ξ)th and 0 < t. p(ξ)U(L),b(0) denotes the upper (lower) bound on the vacuum emission
probability among the L-pulse state for the bit value b ∈ {0, 1} conditioned that the internal parameter of Alice’s
source takes the value of ξ. The upper bound on e
(ξ)
ph , which is also the upper bound of eph, can be readily obtained
by taking the upper bound on maxξ{ν(ξ)th + n−,(ξ)vac,U} as
eph ≤ perr
Q
+
(
1− perr
Q
)maxξ(ν(ξ)th + n−,(ξ)vac,U)
L− 1
≤ perr
Q
+
(
1− perr
Q
)ν(max)th + L−1−ν(max)th2 max{
(√
e−µ
(min)
0 −
√
e−µ
(max)
1
)2
e−µ
(min)
0 +e−µ
(max)
1
,
(√
e−µ
(max)
0 −
√
e−µ
(min)
1
)2
e−µ
(max)
0 +e−µ
(min)
1
}
+max
N
(max)
vacd
{N (max)vacd t}
L− 1 .
(38)
Here, ν
(max)
th is the maximal number of photons contained in the L pulses over all ξ, which is determined such that
esrc = 1 −
∑ν(max)th
ν=0 e
−µ(max)(µ(max))ν/ν! holds for µ(max) denoting µ(max) := maxb∈{0,1} µ
(max)
b , and the maximization
of N
(max)
vacd is taken over the range 1 ≤ N (max)vacd ≤ L− 1− ν(max)th .
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